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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs

:

"
JONATHON SOPER,

Case No.
14501

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of appellant's
motion to vacate a guilty plea, said motion based upon the
breach of a plea bargaining agreement,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court denied appellant's motion to
vacate his guilty plea to a third degree felony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the denial of appellant's
motion to vacate affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of
Facts but wishes to add that the Memorandum Decision
(R-57) of the trial court judge issued after the full
hearing on the Motion to Vacate (T-l) states that the
court was not made aware of the breached plea bargaining
agreement until December 5, 1975, when the Motion to
Vacate the plea was officially brought before the
court.

Further, the Motion to Vacate was denied for

the reason that appellant had waited eight months to
complain of the breached agreement, letting the sentencing
and numerous other opportunities pass before bringing
to the court's attention the unkept agreement (R-57).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE APPELLANT WAITED EIGHT MONTHS TO COMPLAIN
ABOUT THE BREACH OF A PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENT, APPEARING
BEFORE THE COURT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WITHOUT BRINGING
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT THE BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT, HE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO HAVE THE GUILTY PLEA
VACATED.
It is within the discretion of the trial court
to determine whether a guilty plea may be withdrawn.
This rule of law in Utah is set forth in Utah Code Ann.
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§ 77-24-3 (1953), as amended, which provides in part that:
V

". . . the court may at any
time before judgment, upon
a plea of guilty, permit it to
be withdrawn and a plea of not
guilty substituted,"

The Utah Legislature has thus codified the
sound public policy of prohibiting the withdrawal of
a guilty plea after the imposition of sentence, and
has authorized the trial court to examine each request to withdraw a guilty plea according to the unique
circumstances of each case.
The instant case concededly involves the
breach of a plea bargaining agreement on the part of
the state.

Nevertheless, respondent submits that Utah

Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), as amended, still operates
to place discretion within the trial court to decide
whether a guilty plea may be withdrawn, even though
the guilty plea may have been induced by a breached
plea bargaining agreement.
In the instant case, the trial court determined
that a Motion to Vacate a guilty plea brought eight
months after the breach of the plea bargaining agreement,
including a full five months after the imposition of
sentence, was too late for defendant to withdraw the
guilty plea.

The trial court stressed that the passage

of eight months was not the critical factor but rather
that defendant had said nothing about the breach during
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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that time even though he had numerous opportunities to complain of the breach.

By remaining silent about the

breach of the agreement defendant waived his right
to complain after eight months had gone by, the
trial court held.
Defendant has not established that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to
Vacate the guilty plea.

Although defendant relies on

the United States Supreme Court case of Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495
(1971) to argue that the trial court judge abused his
discretion as a matter of law, the Santobello case
involved a different factual situation than that at
issue herein.
In Santobello, the prosecutor agreed to offer
no recommendation for sentencing in exchange for
defendants guilty plea to a lesser charge.

However,

at the time of sentencing a new prosecutor who was not
made aware of the agreement recommended the maximum
sentence.

The defendant's attorney immediately objected

and sought to withdraw the guilty plea.

The trial

court judge refused to permit the withdrawal of the
guilty plea, stating that he was not influenced by the
prosecutor's recommendation.
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The United States Supreme Court found that
Santobello's guilty plea had been induced by the
prosecutor's promise to offer no recommendation as to
sentencing.

The Court thus remanded the case for a

determination by the trial court relative to whether
the circumstances of the case required the withdrawal
of the guilty plea and a new trial, or specific performance of the agreement on the plea and resentencing
by another judge.
In the instant case defendant did not immediately
object to the breach of the plea bargaining agreement.
In fact, he waited until December 5, 197 5, to move the
court to withdraw the guilty plea he had entered on
March 4, 1975. Defendant did not mention at the time of
sentencing on the guilty plea that he had in fact appeared
in Brigham City and entered a guilty plea to a gun
charge and that he was given a concurrent sentence on the
second charge.
The trial court judge has correctly distinguished
the above factual situation from the Santobello case and
thus Santobello cannot be said to require as a matter of
law the withdrawal of the guilty plea in the instant
case.

The trial court judge in the instant case carefully

weighed Santobello, as his memorandum decision (R-57)
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indicates, found it premised upon a different factual
situation than that at issue herein, and determined
that defendant's failure to complain of the unkept plea
bargain for eight months, including the time of
sentencing, waived defendant's right to withdraw the
guilty plea.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is
within the sound discretion of the trial court to
either allow or disallow a guilty plea to be withdrawn•
State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 (1932).

The

Supreme Court will look to the particular facts of each
case to determine if the trial court judge abused
his discretion in refusing to permit the withdrawal of
a guilty plea.

State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378

P.2d 671 (1963).
Given the fact that defendant herein passed
up numerous opportunities to complain of the unkept
plea bargain, that he permitted eight months to pass
before complaining about the breached agreement, that
he said nothing at the time of sentencing, that the
concurrent sentence had long since been served, the
trial court judge in his discretion properly determined
that defendant waited far too long to seek to withdraw
his guilty plea.

Defendant has failed to prove that

the trial court judge abused his discretion in refusing
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to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea given the
above factual situation.
Other cases cited by appellant require no
more than that there be a full factual inquiry into
a defendant's allegation that a guilty plea was induced by an unkept promise.

Walters v. Harris, 460

F.2d 988 (1972); Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487,
82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).

In the instant

case, appellant was given a full hearing,

the above

facts were weighed, and the trial court denied the
Motion to Vacate.
POINT II
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT APPELLANT SHOULD BE
GRANTED A REMEDY, APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO NO MORE
THAN THE BENEFIT OF HIS BARGAIN.
If the court should find that the factual
situation herein requires a remedy for appellant,
respondent would argue that appellant is entitled to
the benefit of his bargain, and no more.

Appellant

relies on Santobello v. New York, supra, to establish
that his guilty plea should be withdrawn.

However,

if the court should find Santobello applicable to
the instant case, respondent would note

that the

Santobello court remanded that case for a determination
as to whether the defendant should be permitted to
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withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial or whether
he should be given the benefit of his bargain.
To permit appellant herein to withdraw
his guilty plea at this late date would greatly
prejudice the state. Appellant would then be given
a trial many months after the incident which is the
subject of the guilty plea.

This delay certainly

would create difficulty in gathering witnesses and
facts necessary for trial. Appellant would greatly
benefit by his own lack of diligence in bringing to
the attention of the court the breach of the plea
bargaining agreement.
Respondent would thus argue that appellant
is entitled to no more than the benefit of his
bargain; should the court find that appellant is
entitled to a remedy.

Although appellant has long

since served a concurrent sentence on the guilty
plea entered in Box Elder County, the record could be
corrected to comply with the plea bargaining agreement.
To permit appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and go
to trial punishes the state for appellant's failure
to complain of the breach of the plea bargaining agreement.

To give appellant the benefit of his bargain

(

~8-
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would place the parties in the position anticipated
at the time the plea bargain was agreed upon.
CONCLUSION
Where appellant let eight months pass before
he complained about the breach of a plea bargaining
agreement, including five months after the imposition
of sentence, and let numerous opportunities go by
without complaining about the unkept agreement,
appellant has waived his right to have the guilty
plea vacated.

If the court should find that appellant

is entitled to a remedy, he should be given no more
than the benefit of the bargain.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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